eSect face grave difficulties in macroeconomics; causal accounts based on counterfactuals are better suited to the job at hand.
CAUSAL CLAIMS AND MACROECONOMIC PRACTICE
Roughly, macroeconomics is the economics of the economy as a whole. Keynes ([1936] , p. 293) distinguished between the theory of the determination of aggregate output and the theory of the individual economic unit (the firm or the consumer), which being small relative to the economy as a whole, takes aggregate output as fixed. Macroeconomics in practice is about the interrelationship among economic aggregates and indexes the relationships between inter alia GNP, the general price and wage levels, employment, unemployment, interest rates, exchange rates, the balance of payments, the budget deficit, and tax rates.
Economics is a social science; but macroeconomics, is remarkably dehumanized. People are at best referred to as representatives of a class; and, mostly, the talk is about variables. The variables employed in macroeconomics are defined pragmatically by the statisticians employed in government offices. Sometimes they take economists' advice, sometimes they do not. There is, therefore, often a mismatch between the variable as it is ideally conceptualized in macroeconomic theories and the data actually collected. For example: in theory, unemployment should be measured relative to the prevailing wage in jobs a potential worker is qualified to perform; but when governments collect unemployment statistics they generally ask only whether a potential worker is seeking work without reference to any particular wage or qualification.
Beyond such practical problems, theory itself is often not sharp. We all have a sense of what it means to experience inflation-i.e. generally rising prices. And economists sound precise when they state that the retail price index rose last month by 4 9 per cent. But what does this meanR Some prices rose a lot, some a little, some may even have fallen. What number gets reported for inflation depends on the weights placed on these various changes in prices. Within broad boundaries, quite arbitrary weighting schemes are theoretically acceptable, yet lead to tremendous differences in the actual numbers reported.l Policy, historically and in current practice, motivates most of macroeconomics. Consequently, causal claims in macroeconomics are largely about the controllability of these imperfect macroeconomic variables. Even noninterventionists base their arguments on controllability: the economy is structured, they claim, in such a way that attempts to control key variables are either futile or perverse. Despite talk in the 1950s and 1960s of fine-tuning the economy, the control that interests policy-makers and practical economists is typically of a rather coarse kind. Generally, the issue is not whether policy can secure a growth rate of GNP of 3 * 75 per cent in the first quarter of 1992 (although such issues do sometimes arise) but whether a reduction in tax rates can reverse a declining level of GNP or whether monetary authorities 'leaning against the wind' (i.e. supplying reserves when the economy is declining and absorbing reserves when it is booming) can smooth the business cycle somewhat. The causal relations of interest are then between variables rather loosely: 'does money cause output?' is more important to practical macroeconomics than 'does Ml at time t cause GNP at time t+2?' It is sometimes argued that control is not the central issue, that as disinterested scientists (economists love to think of themselves as scientists) they should be concerned with explanation. The issues of control and explanation actually operate on different levels. I take it that an adequate causal explanation provides the basis for informed attempts to control particular variables.
Such explanation is generic. Frequently, however, questions are asked requiring singular explanations: did the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait cause the US recession of 1990/91 ? As a matter of division of labor, such questions belong to the historian, not to the policy advisor. Although macroeconomists sometimes play both parts, they more often live for the present and future and generally seek generic explanations. For the typical macroeconomist, then, causality is most usefully described as processes which are the relations of variables rather than as the relations of events. In arguing for causal processes, Salmon ([1984] , pp. 140, 141) implies that it may be possible to translate freely between analysis based on processes and analysis based on events.
TEMPORAL CAUSALITY AND THE S-R BASIS
Causal claims in macroeconomics are usually implicit and casual. When they are explicit, they are most frequently justified by an appeal to so-called 'Granger causality' [Granger, 1969; Sims, 1972] . In practicable tests, a variable X Granger-causes a variable Y if the error variance of a regression of Y on its own past history and on the past history of X is statistically significantly lower than the error variance of a regression of Y on its own past history alone.
There is a great historical divide in economics between analyses based on process and analyses based on equilibrium. Before the 1940s, macroeconomics was largely the analysis of business cycles, and process analysis, or economics dynamics, held sway. After Keynes's General Theory [19 3 6], equilibrium analysis became dominant in macroeconomic theory. The tradition of dynamic analysis was preserved, however, more in Sweden and the United Kingdom than in the United States, as a distinct subfield of econometrics (Morgan [1989 (Morgan [ , 1990 
THE NATURE OF MACROECONOMICS
I shall argue presently that the nature of macroeconomics itself undermines temporal ordering as a foundation for causal analysis. Before that, however, let me suggest some critical features of macroeconomics that are useful in the argument.
As I have already observed, macroeconomics deals in aggregates. These aggregates are composed of the behaviors of individuals. Consumption as reported in the national income accounts is just the summation of the purchases of a nation's citizens. It is tempting then to see economic agents as human molecules (cf. Nelson [1990] ) and the relations postulated in macroeconomic theory or measured in macroeconometrics as the analogues of the ideal gas laws or other macrophysical relations. But there is a crucial and obvious difference: molecules do not make choices, people do; and they do so with reference not just to the immediate past and their immediate surround-ings, but also with reference to future goals and to global or macro relations (e.g. people use the aggregate price level to calculate their real wages in striking wage bargains; firms use information on aggregate GNP in assessing the likely demand for their products). A shorthand term for this feature of macroeconomics is agency: unlike gases, which are composed of inert molecules, economic aggregates are constituted by agents.2 Recognition of an agency problem is the foundation for the research strategy known as the 'representative-agent modelt. An economy is described as if it were populated by a single agent, a Robinson Crusoe whose budget constraint is the entire GNP of the economy. 3 Robinson-Crusoe models gloss over another feature of macroeconomics: the nonhomoqeneity of economic aggregates. The people who constitute economic aggregates are not alike one with another, and do not remain constant in their tastes and circumstances over time. The same numerical value for consumption in the economy as a whole could represent very different patterns of consumption depending on the distribution of income, the demographics of the consumers, and whether it is 1991 or 1941 or 1721. Any stability in such aggregates clearly arises from averaging over behaviors that diverge in fine details. Income studies suggest that the allocation of income into broad categories food, clothing, housing may be relatively constant, but allocation into yoghurt, beer, books, and motorcars varies considerably over time and between age groups, regions, and social classes.
Greater stability in aggregate relations can no doubt be obtained by accounting for the distribution of income, changing tastes, and so forth. This is the empirical counterpart of the program of establishing microfoundations for macroeconomics. In any practical setting, however, one is still limited to (somewhat finer) aggregates: e.g accounting for the distribution of income among quintiles of the population may help explain consumption; but the consumption of a fifth of the population is still a nonhomogeneous aggregate. 9: also see Friedman [1955] and Hayek [1979] , p. 75, fn. 8). Computers are not now or likely to be in the foreseeable future powerful enough to manage such a reduction of aggregates to their components. But this difficulty is not simply a practical one. More fundamentally, the preconditions for such a reduction do not exist. Neoclassical microeconomics, the economic theory of which the profession is so proud, generally assumes that tastes, knowledge, underlying resources, and other background conditions are either fixed, or, at the least, evolve in determinable ways. This is almost surely false. Far from having complete, transitive, and reflexive preferences, peoplc subject to binding constraints to be sure and not completely inconsistent-choose in whimsical, partially informed, and arbitrary ways. Equally, they choose with respect to relatively subtle changes in background conditions. The efficiency gains of a free market system arise precisely because of local adaptability which produces behaviors that, unless viewed from the inside as it were, appear to be random and erratic. The economy is characterized by informational complexity, and can be viewed as a giant computer for solving production and allocation problems (Hayek [1937 (Hayek [ , 1945 .4 One consequence of informational complexity is that the economy is invariably stochastic. Incorporating finer and finer information in the construction of an S-R basis will reduce the residual of unexplained random noise only up to a point. Indeed, a good deal of the stability of aggregates no doubt arises from the mutual canceling out of idiosyncratic behavior to reveal typical or average behavior. This does not suggest that a program of reduction in the direction of microeconomics will not succeed, only that there is probably some optimal level of reduction that none the less involves considerable aggregation. Recognition of nonhomogeneity and informational complexity does not imply the independence of macroeconomics from microeconomics; indeed agency reminds us that the two are closely tied together. The relationship between them is one of supervenience. Macroeconomic aggregates are what they are and behave as they do because of the underlying behavior of individual people. One cannot, however, give a complete accounting of macroeconomics from the microeconomics alone. Macroeconomics supervenes on, but is not reducible to, microeconomics.
TEMPORAL ORDERING AND OBSERVATIONAL EQUIVALENCE
Although there are no barriers to extending the analysis to nonlinear, noncontinuous functions, much of the debate about causal structure in economics uses the framework of linear models (see Hoover [1990] which they referred to as causal chains, were preferred for technical reasons and because they gave more accurate rendering of causal asymmetry: if x1 causes x2, x2 does not cause x1. In these debates, the ejs were taken to be random shock terms. Basmann [1965] demonstrated conclusively that any system represented as a causal chain could be equally well represented as an interdependent system. Based on the equivalence between regression and conditionalization, Basmann's point is simply that structure I can be taken to represent the joint probability distribution of xl and x2, while structure II is a partition of that distribution into the product of a conditional and marginal distribution. Thus, a theorem from the theory of probability states ( 5 ) Pr(xl, x2) = Pr(x2 I xl )Pr(xl ) = Pr(xl t vc2)Pr(x2).
The left-hand expression corresponds to structure I (interdependence); the center expression corresponds to structure II (x1 causes x2); and the righthanded expression reverses the direction of causation (x2 causes x1 ). Data on the xis alone cannot distinguish one case from another.
Simon did not consider stochastic systems explicitly, but he was aware of the root problem (Simon [1953] , pp. 24-6). Allow the ejs to be deterministic parameters. Then for the same values of the bijs, e3 and e4, the variables x1 and x2 will have the same solution in structure II as in structure I.6 In general, since any linear combinations of (1) Cartwright's solution is quite diSerent, relying on temporal order. She cites the econometrician Edmund Malinvaud to the efect that apparent cases of mutual causality between x1 and x2 would turn out with fine enough division of the time line to be cases of x] t causing x2 t+1 causing x1 t+2 and so forth (Cartwright [1989] , p. 12 7). She thus refines Woldis causal chains by insisting that, when a variable is ordered recursively ahead of another, it also occurs before it in time; i.e. contemporaneous causality is ruled out. If all the causal factors are fully specified then the eis, here again interpreted as random errors, are uncorrelated with each other. In such a system, she shows, observational equivalence is detectable because one cannot take linear combinations of true causal equations and still have the errors in diSerent equations uncorrelated with each other (cf. LeRoy [1991] , pp. 12, 13). For example, if Structure II represents the true causal order (e3 and e4 uncorrelated), then one linear transformation converting it to structure I would imply el=(e3+e4) and e2=e3, so that e1 and e2 would be correlated.
OBJECTIONS TO TEMPORAL ORDERING
Cartwright's imposition of temporal order on causal chains is formally sufflcient to eliminate the problem of observational equivalence. I now want to argue that the three features of macroeconomics already discussed agency, 70I nonhomogeneity and informational complexity undertnine causal accounts like Cartwright's based on temporal ordering. Actual macroeconometric models cannot be usefully forced into the mold of temporally ordered causal chains. I shall indicate three problems.
( 1 ) Frequency of Observation Cartwright (1989, p. 1 7) imagines an economic structure to be a temporally ordered causal chain. This formulation is econometrically too restrictive. Consider Structure III (Figure 1) , which is the analogue to Structure II, but with many variables. Each variable is indexed by a time subscript. Each equation includes all of the variables on the right-hand side that are dated before the variable on the left-hand side. If e' = [e1, e2, . . . enl is the row vector of random error terms from Structure III, then E(ee') = E is the variance/ covariance matrix of the ejs. Cartwright's requirement that ess be uncorrelated is the requirement that E be diagonal, since the off-diagonal elements of E are the covariances which must be zero for the eis to be uncorrelated.8 Her suggestion is that if all the appropriate causal factors are included on the righthand sides of the equations in Structure III that E will be diagonal by construction. 
Structure III is very nearly what macroeconometricians refer to as a vector autoregression: each current variable is regressed on its own past values and
the past values of every other variable. In practice, the variance/covariance matrices from vector autoregressions are never diagonal. Why? Why are they not diagonal by construction as they are in Cartwright's account? There must be some specification error. Perhaps we have omitted a causally relevant factor or perhaps we have not allowed for long enough lags.9 These are genuine problems, but there is another more troubling one. In Cartwright's account, variables dated the same should not have explanatory power for each other, once past-dated variables are taken into account. But, in fact, they do.
Macroeconomic data are reported most often annually or quarterly, not uncommonly monthly, rarely weekly, and extremely rarely daily or more frequently. Prices, interest rates, and stock data are sampled at some particular time of the year, quarter or month. Flow data (e.g. GNP which equals the production of new goods and services per unit time) add up all the units occurring during the year, quarter, or month. Thus, GNP for the first quarter is the production on each day of January, February, and March added together. Granger ([1969] , pp. 3 77-8) suggests that apparent contemporaneous causality would vanish if data were sampled at fine enough intervals. But such finer and finer intervals would exacerbate certain conceptual difficulties in the foundations of economics. There are hours during the day when there is no production; does GNP fall to nought in those hours and grow astronomically when production resumes? Such wild fluctuations in GNP are economically meaningless. Few goods perish in the instant of their production (electricity and the services of prostitutes come to mind); but, if a good endures, it is not new production (and therefore not GNP) but part of the stock of capital. The standard answer to this is to say that GNP is really the flow of services from the stocks of (depreciating) goods. Some goods just depreciate, and yield their services up faster than others. There is in practice, however, no way to quantify and measure such flows that suffers from any fewer or less serious conceptual problems than temporal aggregation itself. Economists therefore are unlikely to, even in principle, force macroeconomics into the straitjacket of causal structures that rule out contemporeaneous causality.
(2) Hidden Variables and Temporal Reversal
Nonhomogeneity and informational complexity complicate any attempts to sample macroeconomic data too frequently. Agency presents its own complications. The Appendix presents details of a model of the following form: the price level rises to make the demand for money equal to the stock of money inherited from the last period; the demand for money itself depends not only positively on the price level but also negatively on the rate of inflation (the percentage change in the price level), because inflation imposes a real cost on anyone who holds the money while it loses value; and the money supply is set as the sum of a genuine random process and the apparently random process from a deterministic pseudo-random-number generator. If the public is ignorant of the deterministic component of the money supply then money Granger-causes prices. However, if the public (but not the econometrician) knows the truth about the deterministic component, then prices Grangercause money. This is because if they know that the deterministic component of the money stock will increase, they expect prices to rise in future; they, therefore, expect inflation and a loss on holding cash; they, therefore, reduce their current demand for money, which pushes current prices up in order to equilibrate supply and demand. Increases in current prices help to predict money in future, even though prices can actually rise only if money increases at some time; i.e. control of the money stock is sufflcient to control price changes. 1() It was crucial to this example that the public be better informed than the econometrician. Indeed, one way to think about the issue is arising from an omitted third cause. If expectations were directly observable, then an expectations variable would screen oF the apparent causal effect of prices on money. The existence of such a variable is problematic. True, people form expectations and act upon them (that is the agency issue), but such expectations do not exist independently of the actions they affect; they are not palpable like so many pounds of rice bought by a consumer; they are hidden variables. Of course, one could ask people to sate their expectations. That, however, would be simply their guess about how they would act or would have acted in a situation that was not yet at hand or had passed already. Such expectations are no more directly observable to an individual than their own preferences, and are subject to the same whimsy arbitrariness and adjustment to subtle changes in background conditions. Furthermore, it is not an individual's expectations that matter, but those of the entire population. Thus, expectations are subject to all of the same problems of nonhomogeneity and informational complexity that plague all macroeconomic aggregates. Programs to reduce these problems and to better assess expectations are likely to be fruitful; pushing those programs to their logical extreme would eliminate macroeconomics altogether. In the short run, P causes M and M causes P; but temporal order is respected. possible, the explanandum has shifted to the individual from the macroeconomic variable: macroeconomics would be denatured.ll
EVEN ECONOMISTS DON T KNOW HOW TO GET CAUSES FROM PROBABILITIES
My argument has been that a causal concept that fundamentally requires temporal ordering is not compatible with macroeconomics as it is practiced. It might be argued that further knowledge and further advances will lead to a macroeconomic theory in which all causal relations are temporally ordered. While I cannot absolutely rule it out, I believe that there are good reasons not to believe that macroeconomics will develop that way. It is a not very wellsupported prejudice to insist that it will. One might agree with my prognosis for macroeconomics, yet still continue to insist on temporal ordering: if macroeconomics cannot be beat into that mold, so much the worse for macroeconomics. In conclusion, as far as macroeconomics is concerned, an account of causal propagation will solve our most pressing problems, while insisting on temporal ordering threatens to undercut macroeconomic explanations altogether.
APPENDIX. AN ILLUSTRATION OF EXPECTATIONS-INDUCED REVERSAL OF GRANGER-CAUSALITY
The following is an illustration of reverse Granger-causality based on a model similar to one discussed in Hoover ([1988 Now since it is obvious that var(Pt_l)>O, d>O. It is extremely messy to calculate var(vt). However, the fact that d>O combined with the fact that omitting a variable from a regression cannot decrease the residual variance of the regression if sample sizes are large enough, implies that Pt_ 1 has predictive power for Mt: i.e. Pt_1 Granger-causes Mt, which is the reversal of causal direction that we sought. It might be objected that in the case in which the public does not know Bt, we have sought only instantaneous Granger-causality, and indeed that we have not played by the rules of strict temporal ordering because money demand and supply and expectations were all dated in the initial model at time t. It is, however, easy to write down a model in which temporal ordering is respected that is exactly analogous to the model examined here. Solutions to that model have precisely the same character as those presented here, but are even more tedious and messy to derive.
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